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Abstract
According to an oft-quoted piece of folk wisdom, if one wants something accomplished, the best
person to ask is a busy person. We tested a version of this proposition in two studies. Study 1
exposed participants to a helping request in which cues promoting the relevant behavior were
made more salient than those inhibiting it. Study 2 featured a request in which inhibiting cues
were made more salient than cues promoting the behavior. In both studies, participants who were
“busied” by high cognitive load showed more influence of the dominant behavioral pressure than
did participants under minimal load. The results suggest that busy people can respond more to a
helping appeal, but only when cues facilitating helping are more salient than those discouraging it.
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“If you want something done, ask a busy person.” The premise underlying this familiar
adage (see Byrne, 2008; Marks & MacDermid, 1996) is that busy people are those enviable
(or annoying) individuals who are especially efficient and thus most likely to accomplish a
task successfully when called upon to do so. But another possibility presents itself—one also
captured by the aforementioned aphorism but involving a less sanguine interpretation.
Perhaps busy individuals can be so cognitively distracted that they are unable to attend to
valid reasons for turning down a request. This alternative informed the studies reported here.
Myopia Models
Support for this “distraction” account comes from work by Steele, Josephs, and colleagues
on alcohol myopia, “an acute state of shortsightedness in which [intoxicated individuals]
process fewer cues less well” (Steele & Josephs, 1988, p. 197). In one early investigation of
what they termed inhibitory conflict (see Steele & Southwick, 1985), Steele, Critchlow, and
Liu (1985) exposed both sober and intoxicated participants to a situation that pitted
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pressures to engage in a behavior against those associated with resisting the behavior. In
particular, individuals were asked to help an experimenter by agreeing to complete an
extremely boring task (namely, repeatedly crossing out certain letters in a series of identical
paragraphs). Participants thus faced a conflict between their desire to help the experimenter
and their inclination to avoid the tedious task. The results of the study showed that drunk
individuals were more likely to accede to a request for help with the task than were sober
individuals, but only when environmental cues promoting helping (occasioned by an
especially impassioned plea by the experimenter) dominated those favoring resistance.
According to the researchers, alcohol intoxication made it difficult to focus on anything
except the salient need for help expressed by the experimenter in the study. Indeed, when
prominent cues failed to promote helping, drunk individuals were no more likely than sober
individuals to agree to provide assistance.
Josephs and Steele (1990) maintained that alcohol myopia arises because alcohol
“consistently impairs the capacity to engage in controlled, effortful cognitive processing” (p.
115; see also Giancola, Josephs, Parrott, & Duke, 2010). More recently, Mann and Ward
(2004, 2007) advanced the attentional myopia model, arguing that any source of cognitive
limitation can potentially result in the same shortsighted attentional consequences observed
in studies of alcohol by Steele et al. and by others (e.g., MacDonald, Fong, & Zanna, 2000).
In prior investigations, both eating and smoking behavior have been shown to be influenced
by salient environmental cues when participants have found themselves under significant
cognitive load (Ward & Mann, 2000; Westling, Mann, & Ward, 2006).
The Present Research
In the studies reported here, we sought to investigate the implications of the attentional
myopia model for helping, focusing on attentional limitation in the presence of salient cues
that either promoted or inhibited the behavior in question. To impose limits on attention, we
chose a task that pretesting revealed would present a significant cognitive load but would
not be so distracting to participants that they could not heed the pertinent helping request. At
the same time, it allowed us to ensure that participants would be exposed to a continuous
source of cognitive load, requiring sustained attention, even while they attempted to process
and respond to the request. Participants played a video game that involved either substantial
or minimal cognitive demands while being asked to engage in helping behavior—a request
in which salient cues ensured that the pressure to comply would either be strong (Study 1) or
weak (Study 2). Consistent with our past research on attentional myopia, we predicted that
participants under high cognitive load would be more influenced by relevant cues that either
promoted or inhibited helping behavior than would participants under minimal cognitive
load.
Study 1
Method
Participants—Fifty-eight undergraduate participants (34 females, 24 males; mean age =
18.21 years) completed the study in individual sessions in partial fulfillment of an
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introductory psychology course requirement. The study took place in a psychology
laboratory.
Procedure—Participants were informed by a male experimenter that the study involved
two tests of cognitive abilities, one linguistic and one spatial. They then completed a mood
measure, namely, the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), after which they were introduced to the “linguistic test,” an
arduous and boring task. The task was adapted from the one used by Steele et al. (1985) and
was designed to create a conflict in a participant's mind between the need to help the
experimenter and the desire to avoid engaging in an unpleasant task.
In this investigation, the task consisted of a series of identical passages composed of
“greeking” text—nonsense words designed to mimic Latin-based language. Participants
were instructed to go through the passages and cross out every a and e in the text,
completing as many passages as possible in ten minutes. The experimenter then left the
room and returned at the allotted time, at which point participants completed a post-task
questionnaire.
After filling out the questionnaire, participants were told that they would next be completing
a spatial test that made use of a computer game. The rules of the game were explained, and
participants were informed that the first two minutes of the game would constitute a practice
session, after which the computer would begin to record their performance for an additional
8 minutes. The experimenter indicated that he would inform the participants when five
minutes had elapsed and then exited the room.
After five minutes, the experimenter returned and, while participants continued to play the
video game, he delivered the following message:
OK, you're halfway through with the spatial test; keep playing, as the computer is
still scoring you. After you finish playing the game and the computer records your
score, I need you to repeat the first linguistic ability test that you did a few minutes
ago, crossing out as and es in short passages, with a different passage. Obviously,
the more data I collect, the better; can you give me an idea of how many more
passages you'd be willing to complete, and I'll go make copies? I need you to do at
least one, but I'd really appreciate it if you could do more.
Participants then completed the primary dependent variable, adapted from Steele et al.
(1985), which consisted of a measure of each participant's intention to help the
experimenter. Specifically, they were handed a sheet to indicate the number of additional
passages they were willing to complete (see below). The experimenter then departed again,
and participants completed the remaining portion of the game.
After the gaming session was complete, the experimenter returned with a stack of greeking-
text passages, along with a second copy of the PANAS, which he asked participants to fill it
out prior to beginning the second linguistic test. After completing the PANAS, and again
consistent with Steele et al. (1985), participants were told that they in fact did not have to
complete the test, at which point they were debriefed.
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Cognitive Load Manipulation: The cognitive load manipulation made use of a video game
known as Armagetron, a free, open-source computer game based on a scene from the
(original) motion picture Tron. The object of the game is to “drive” a small motorcycle,
called a lightcycle, around an enclosed virtual playing surface. As the lightcycle is driven, a
solid barrier extends from behind it, creating a virtual wall. For each round of the game,
driving the lightcycle into one's own wall, another player's wall, or the outer wall of the
playing space results in a loss, while forcing an opponent into a wall produces a win.
For participants in the low cognitive-load condition, the game was configured to include a
single computer-controlled opponent that moved at a slow pace, resulting in a task that
presented minimal challenge to the player (see Figure 1a). By contrast, participants in the
high-cognitive load condition faced three other computer-controlled opponents, all of whom
moved at eight times the speed of the cycle in the low-load condition, resulting in a task that
pretesting revealed was extremely challenging to perform successfully without crashing (see
Figure 1b).
Dependent Measures: In addition to completing the PANAS twice during the session,
participants filled out a post-task questionnaire that included the following three items:
“How difficult did you find the linguistic test?”, “How enjoyable did you find the linguistic
test?”, and “How boring did you find the linguistic test?” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). It
also asked, “How many copies of the linguistic test did you complete in the 10-minute
session?”. After this final item, a blank line was provided for participants to fill in with the
appropriate number. Finally, in response to the experimenter's request to complete additional
passages, participants were given a sheet listing the numbers 1 through 20 (with 20
equivalent to almost twice the maximum number of passages any participant had completed
during the preliminary phase of the study) and asked to circle the numeral corresponding to
the number of additional passages they were willing to complete. This constituted our
primary dependent measure.
Results
Preliminary Ratings—A total of 137 undergraduate raters were asked to read the script
employed by the experimenter to solicit additional passage completions from participants in
both Study 1 and Study 2 (with order of the two scripts counterbalanced). After reading the
first script, raters were asked, “under those circumstances,” to what extent did they feel that
(a) they “really should complete additional passages,” and (b) it would be “okay to not
complete any additional passages” (1 = not at all; 9 = a great deal). They were then
presented with the script employed in the other study and asked to respond to the same two
items again. With respect to the script employed in Study 1, raters reported greater
endorsement of the item indicating that they should complete additional passages (M = 5.36,
SD = 2.35) than the item indicating that it would be okay not to (M = 4.63, SD = 2.40),
paired t(136) = 2.02, p =.05, d=0.17. This finding thus confirms that perceived pressures to
comply with the experimenter's strong helping request to complete more of the task were
stronger than pressures to resist it.
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Preliminary Measures—Participants in the high cognitive-load condition (M = 6.68, SD
= 1.49) did not differ from those in the low cognitive-load condition (M = 6.90, SD = 1.69)
in terms of how many initial passages they completed, t(56) < 1. The two groups also did not
differ significantly in how difficult (Mhigh load = 2.21, SD = 1.23; Mlow load = 2.33, SD =
1.27), t(56) < 1, or boring (Mhigh load = 4.57, SD = 1.73; Mlow load = 5.27, SD = 1.80), t(56) =
1.50, p = .14, they found the crossing-out task. There was, by chance, a marginally
significant difference in how enjoyable the high cognitive-load participants found the task
(M = 2.79, SD = 1.34), as compared to the low cognitive-load participants (M = 2.07, SD =
1.41), t(56) = 1.98, p =.052. However, controlling for this variable in the relevant regression
analysis did not significantly alter the statistical significance of the primary result (i.e., the
cognitive load effect on helping) reported in the next section, Sobel z =1.39, p = .16.
A 2 × 2 analysis of variance (Cognitive Load × Gender) revealed that results on the primary
dependent measure reported below (i.e., the number of additional paragraphs that
participants indicated they were willing to complete) were unaffected by participant gender,
F(1, 54) < 1, nor was there a significant main effect of gender for this measure, F(1, 54) =
2.70, p > .10. Similarly, analyses of covariance revealed no significant main effect of
participants' initial or final scores on the PANAS for this result, both Fs < 1. In addition,
participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly in their initial affect, final
affect, or change in affect, all ts < 1. Indeed, the absence of significant differences between
the two groups on any item within the PANAS (including such items as “interested,” “alert,”
“distressed,” and “excited”) suggests that the cognitive load manipulation did not exert a
differential emotional impact on the two groups. Moreover, mean levels of ratings for the
PANAS items “upset” and “hostile” on the post-task survey were both below 2 (i.e., “a
little”) on the relevant 5-point scale (which, it will be recalled, ranged from 1 = very slightly
or not at all to 5 = extremely), suggesting no pronounced negative effects in either condition
from playing this particular video game (cf. Anderson et al., 2010). The variables of gender
and mood receive no further discussion in this report.
Primary Dependent Measure—When faced with the request from the experimenter to
complete additional passages, participants in the high cognitive load condition offered to
complete more passages (M = 7.11, SD = 4.06) than did participants in the low cognitive-
load condition (M = 5.40, SD = 1.94), t(56) = 2.07, p = .043, d = .54.
Discussion
As predicted, creating a situation in which pressures promoting compliance with a helping
request were stronger than those inhibiting compliance (as confirmed by raters) resulted in
greater acquiescence to the request by those who were under high cognitive load than by
those not as cognitively distracted. These findings thus confirm and extend those of Steele et
al. (1985), who found similar results when participants' cognitive capacities were limited
after ingesting alcohol. The findings reported here suggest that, like alcohol, cognitive load
can lead participants to focus disproportionate attention on a salient request for assistance, to
the neglect of more distal reasons for refusing the request.
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Of course, alternative explanations for these findings are possible (though, as with the Steele
et al. (1985) studies, one alternative factor, mood, does not appear to have played a
significant role). Accordingly, in an additional test of the attentional myopia model, we
carried out a second study in which we endeavored to create inhibiting pressures that were
stronger than pressures promoting helping behavior. Once again, we predicted that the more
salient pressure would especially drive the responses of those participants whose attention
had been limited through the imposition of cognitive load. In the study, we adopted the same
procedure as in Study 1, except that we altered the helping appeal delivered by the
experimenter to weaken relevant cues promoting helping and strengthen those that
discouraged it.
Study 2
Method
Participants—A total of 102 undergraduate participants (47 females, 55 males; mean age
= 19.97 years) completed the study in partial fulfillment of an introductory psychology
course requirement.
Procedure—All procedures and measures were identical to those employed in Study 1,
with the exception of the messaged conveyed to the participant by the experimenter after 5
minutes had elapsed during the computer game task. In this study, while participants
continued to play the video game, the experimenter delivered a request designed to create a
situation in which the inhibiting pressures opposing further assistance dominated those
pressures promoting additional helping. The message read as follows:
OK, you're halfway through with the spatial test; keep playing, as the computer is
still scoring you. After you finish playing the game and the computer records your
score, I'd like you to repeat the first cognitive ability test that you did a few minutes
ago, crossing out as and es in short passages, with a different passage. Can you
give me an idea of how many more passages you'd be willing to complete and I'll
go make copies? I realize you may be tired, so if you don't want to do more, please
don't feel any pressure to do so.
Results
Preliminary Ratings—After reading the Study 2 experimenter script, our student raters
indicated that, “under those circumstances,” it was more likely that it would be “okay to not
complete any additional passages” (M = 6.65, SD = 2.20) than that they “really should
complete additional passages” (M = 4.03, SD = 2.28), paired t(136) = 7.79, p < .001, d = .
67.1 These ratings thus suggested that, in this study, we had succeeded in creating a scenario
1Comparisons of ratings across the two studies lend further support to the hypothesized balance of pressures created by the respective
appeals from the experimenter. When asked whether they should complete additional passages, raters responded to the experimenter
script for Study 1, in which pressures to help were designed to dominate those inhibiting helping, with much greater endorsement of
the relevant item (M = 5.36, SD = 2.35) than they did in response to the experimenter script for Study 2 (M = 4.03, SD = 2.28), paired
t(136) = 6.00, p < .001, in which inhibiting pressures were designed to be dominant. Similarly, when asked if it would be okay not to
complete additional passages, raters responded to the script in Study 2 with significantly higher ratings (M = 6.65, SD = 2.20) than
they did with respect to the script in Study 1 (M = 4.63, SD = 2.40), paired t(136) = 8.57, p < .001.
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in which perceived pressures to resist the experimenter's rather weak request and thus refuse
to complete more of the boring task were stronger than pressures to comply with the request.
Preliminary Measures—As in Study 1, participants in the high cognitive-load condition
(M = 7.09, SD = 2.00) did not differ significantly from those in the low cognitive-load
condition (M = 6.43, SD = 2.11) in terms of how many initial passages they completed,
t(100) = 1.61, p = .11. And the two groups did not differ significantly in how difficult
(Mhigh load = 2.16, SD = 1.16; Mlow load = 2.22, SD = 1.13), enjoyable (Mhigh load = 2.23, SD
= 1.38; Mlow load = 2.37, SD = 1.25), or boring (Mhigh load = 5.21, SD = 1.80; Mlow load =
5.04, 1.74) they rated the initial passage task, all ts < 1.
Primary Dependent Measure—When faced with the request from the experimenter to
complete more passages, participants in the high cognitive load condition offered to
complete fewer additional passages (M = 2.54, SD = 3.30) than did participants in the low
cognitive-load condition (M = 4.28, SD = 4.76), t(100) = 2.18, p = .03, d = .43.
Discussion
Upon exposure to pressures to resist a helping request that were stronger than those
promoting helping (as confirmed by raters), participants under high cognitive load agreed to
complete fewer additional passages than did those under low load. In their investigation,
Steele et al. (1985) did not include a manipulation explicitly intended to test the effect of
pitting salient inhibiting pressures against less potent promoting pressures (but see
MacDonald et al. (2000) for such an investigation in a related domain). However, in what
they referred to as the “low inhibitory conflict” condition, minimal pressure to comply with
the helping request was applied, resulting in intoxicated participants in fact exhibiting less
helping behavior than sober participants (though the result failed to reach conventional
levels of significance). The findings reported here provide the first explicit evidence that
individuals performing a cognitively demanding task will offer significantly less assistance
than less distracted individuals when pressures to perform the relevant task are evidently
outweighed by pressures not to do so.
In two studies, individuals were exposed to conflicting behavioral pressures that, on balance,
either promoted or inhibited helping behavior. In each case, consistent with the attentional
myopia model, participants' responses showed more influence of the stronger pressure when
they found their attention occupied by a cognitively demanding (but not overwhelming) task
than when they were less distracted. Indeed, an analysis of the effects sizes associated with
the two studies presented here revealed a predicted pattern (see Mann & Ward (2004) for a
similar pattern of results across samples). That is, whereas in Study 1 the imposition of
cognitive load significantly increased intentions to help under conditions designed to
promote helping behavior, r = .26, that same cognitive load significantly decreased
intentions to help when study conditions instead served to decrease helping (see Figure 2), r
= −.21, resulting in a significant difference between the two studies, z = 2.85, p = .002.
It would seem, then, that asking a (cognitively) busy person can be an effective strategy for
eliciting assistance on an unpleasant task, but only if cues promoting helping are more
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salient than those opposing it. Otherwise, our results suggest, one might fare better by asking
a cognitively unoccupied person instead.
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Figure 1.
Video game scenarios faced by participants under low (a) and high (b) cognitive load.
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Figure 2.
Number of paragraphs agreed to be completed by participants under low vs. high cognitive
load in Study 1 (promoting pressure stronger) and Study 2 (inhibiting pressure stronger).
Error bars represent standard errors.
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